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Virtues and Vices
of Interpreted Classical Formalisms:
Some Impertinent Questions for Pavel Materna
on the Occasion of His 70th Birthday
GORAN SUNDHOLM
1. The Background to the Charge
My acquaintance with [he work of the late Pavel Tichy stems from the Witt-
genstein Centenary Symposium at Kirchberg in August 1989. His book The
Foundations of Frege's Logic had just been published at forbidding cost by
de Gruyter in Berlin and was on offer at a discount. From a subjective point
of view it was immediately clear that the work was highly interesting and
probably important: even a cursory inspection showed that Tichy shared
many of my logical prejudices and preferences. That I bought the book was
a foregone conclusion.
On further acquaintance with the work it was manifest that my first im-
pression had been right: Tichy was a powerful writer with a highly inter-
esting story and strong words with which to tell it. 1 could not but regret that
his chosen title and mode of exposition carry the suggestion of his being
primarily interested in Frege-exegesis: first and foremost, the book is a pro-
vocative presentation of Tichy's own position and not that of Frege. Possible
because of this discrepancy between title and content, Tichy's work has
been undeservedly neglected.
The work attracts through terse and pointed statements, for instance:
Twentieth-century logicians turned away from Frege not because
they refuted him but because they decided to ignore him. ... A new
paradigm arose; and paradigms, of course, do not assert themselves
through rational argument but through intellectual stampede.
I beg to be excused from joining the stampede called symbolic
logic. Turning logic into the study of an artificial language (which
nobody speaks) does not strike me as the height of wisdom.1
Also the fine Chapter 13 on Inference is highly congenial, with its stress
on the meaningfulness of the underlying formal logic and its trenchant ar-
Pavel Tichy, The Foundations of Frege's Logic. Berlin, de Gruyter. 1988, Preface,
p. via.
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guments against the unreflective use of mere assumptions in comentuai
derivations of the Natural-deduction style. However, it proved quite difficult
to go beyond such first flares of recognition. The book is not written in an
accessible key and did not provide a compelling reason for putting in the
(not inconsiderable) intellectual effort that is necessary in order to master the
Transparent Intensional Logic, Tichy's foremost formal creation.
1 gained deeper understanding only in the late 1990's when I became a
regular participant in the annual LOGICA conferences that are organised at
Castle Liblice by the Department of Logic at the Institute of Philosophy of
the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. As so often it was not
further reading, but personal contact, that provided the necessary insight, in
my case the catalyst was the passionate impromptu expositions of Pavel
Materna (rather than his formal conference talks). These discourses were
delivered either in the congenial surrounding of the castle garden at Liblice,
or Socratically in his favourite Prague wine bar, and served to rekindle my
interest in Tichy's work, and TIL in particular. I also realised that I was not
the only one to be intrigued (or lured'!) by Pavel's insistent advocacy, a fact
to which the present volume bears ample witness; it is gratifying to see how
Materna's untiring work in promoting interest in Tichy's work has begun to
bear fruit.
The most important difference between Tichy's work and 98.3 % of the
rest of contemporary logic is that TIL uses an interpreted formal logic. After
the advent of Hubert's metamathematics and its maturation in the works of
Gödel, Tarski, and Bemays from the early 1930's, the formal languages
used in logic have been uninterpreted (meta)mathematicaS objects of study.
A well-formed formula <p in such a language does not say or state anything.
It is not intended for communication, and does not signify, but serves merely
as an object of study. The wff s are not used for speaking; we only talk
about them. Within the ensuing metalogical tradition a great logician is one
who proves deep mathematical theorems concerning metamathematica!
formalisms. Here the paradigm is stili constituted by the theorems of Gödel:
Completeness, Incompleteness and Consistency of the Continuum Hypo-
thesis.
Previously, though, the task of a logician was not to prove such theorems
about formal systems; on the contrary, his task was to design a sizeable
formal language in which mathematics could be carried out. In particular.
the formal language of such a system had to be an interpreted one. Examples
of such systems are provided in the great works of Frege and Russell:
Frege's "conceptual notation" (Begriffssckrifi) and Russell's Ramified the-
ory of Types are both interpreted systems. Wittgenstein's Tractatus, on the
other hand, can be seen as attempt to provide the required meaning-explana-
tions for the systems of the Frege-Russell kind. Less well-known examples
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are provided by the systems of Curry, Church, and Quine. Lesniewski must
count as a major exponent of the trend. The logical work of Rudolf Carnap
also falls within this paradigm. It is possible to view even the later Quine, at
least the Quine of (he time-slice corresponding to Mathematical Logic, as
belonging to this group. After 1940, however, it is very rare to find authors
that still adhere to the older paradigm. Alonzo Church's classic Introduction
to Mathematical Logic from 1956 is an example of a later work which looks
(or longs'!) back to the earlier period.
2. The Charge
Of contemporary systems only the Intuitionistic Type Theory designed by
Per Martin-Lof and Pavel Tichy's TIL even begin to approach the efforts of
the older paradigm. My admiration for Tichy's courage is great; his surety of
touch in opting for the construction of a sizeable interpreted formal system
is impressive. When giving his meaning-explanations Tichy. like his mentor
Gottlob Frege, strives for a full-blown, all-out realist version that validates
all of a modal ramified classical type theory. And this is precisely the spot
where 1 beg to be counted out. I simply do no believe that the meaning-ex-
planations of Tichy do establish what has to be established.
However, without the valuable expositions unselfishly offered by Pavel
Materna in his survey Concepts and Objects, I would not even have begun
to understand "the great works of Tichy".2 Accordingly. I will avail myself
of the occasion and address my worries, not to Tichy, but to his namesake
Materna, and in particular to the explanations offered in his monograph.
These worries are largely variants of criticisms offered from within the con-
structivist camp in the philosophy of mathematics, from Kronecker onwards.
Tichy's TIL is a type theory, not unlike the simple type theory of
Church, but it has more ground (or base) types than Church's type o (of
truth-values) and type t (of individuals). The additional base types in (Ma-
terna's version of) TIL are (he type <a (of possible worlds) and the type T (of
real numbers that also serve as indices for time-points). Thus, the base is the
set {o, i, u), T }. Furthermore the type-structure over this set of basic types is
generated using partial instead of total functions:
(i) Every base type is a type.
(ii) When ßi,...,ßt, and a, are types then (aßi,...,ßj) is the type of partial
functions from (a subset of) ßi x ... x ß, to (a subset of) a.
My worries concerning TIL largely pertain to these notions only. What Ma-
terna does using his framework has, grosso modo, my general blessing,
especially, for instance, concerning "constructions". However, in my opin-
" Pave] Materna, Concepts and Objects. Acsa Philosophica Fennica 63, Helsinki
1998. Arabic numerals within brackets are page references to this monograph.
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ion, the explanations offered for the ground notions do not suffice to turn his
formalism into an interpreted formal language: they simply do not deliver
the required goods.
3. The Case against the Base Type i
What is an individual? Materna's answer is
Individuals are simple material entities possessing no non-trivial
property essentially. (27)
For sure, this explanation of the notion of an individual does not make it
easy to know individuals. Are there any individuals at all? How do we know
that something is an individual?
First, it seems, we have to know that something is a "simple material en-
tity"? What is an entity, that is, what are the application- and identity-criteria
for the type (kind, sort, ...) entity^ Is material a property of entities? Or is
material entity a type (kind, sort, ...)? If so, what are the application- and
identity-criteria for material entity"! Whatever the answer to these questions,
there remains the answer to the questions concerning simple. Does it qualify
entity, material or material entity! Depending on the answers here a whole
tree of alternatives is generated. So the notion of a simple material entity
seems anything but simple.
Secondly, when we finally have got to know a simple material entity we
have to know that it has no non-trivial property essentially. What is a non-
trivial property? What is it to have a property (be it trivial, or not) essen-
tially!
Furthermore, an application criterion alone does not suffice to fix a type;
there also remains the question of the appropriate ;Vfenriry-criterion. That is,
we need also an answer to the question:
What is it for two individuals to be equal individuals?
This clearly demands an answer to the question what it is for two simple
material entities to be equal simple material entities. This, however, is not
enough. It must also be taken into account what effect, if any, that privation
with respect to non-trivial essential properties has for the identity of simple
material entities.
This battery of questions shows the lengths to which one has to go before
one has the right to make a claim of the form
r e i,
Concerning the need for application- and identity-criteria, see my "Identity:
Absolute, Criteria!, Propositional". The LOGICA Yearbook 1998, ed. Timothy
Childers, Prague, Filosofia, 1999, 20-26.
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that is,
/is an individual.
Whether I (or we) would ever be in that position, I feel very uncertain about.
4. The Case against the Base Type o
What is a truth-value? From Materna's text the following answers can be
culled (21). The truth-values are TRUE and FALSE. They are objects. Sen-
tences denote truth-values. The denoting ("having") can depend on empiri-
cal facts. Indeed:
The entities which can be—depending on empirical facts—true or
false (or lack any truth-value) are usually called propositions. (27)
Since !he truth-values form a type o I will yet again press the questions con-
cerning application- and identity-criteria. This time an answer seems to be
forthcoming. TRUE and FALSE are both truth-values, where TRUE = TRUE and
FALSE = FALSE, and the rule
SS i PJTRUE/;] P[FALSE /:]
PIS/z]
is valid.
Materna's explanation of propositions, though, in the quote above, seems
to make any entity into a proposition. Entities which can be true or false are
propositions, but so are also entities which can, possibly even depending on
empirical facts, lack a truth-value. But anything non-linguistic can lack a
truth-value, so anything non-linguistic fulfils Materna's condition for propo-
sition-hood. Surely this cannot be right? (In the sequel I will disregard this
unfortunate rider of Materna's.)
When propositions are construed in such a (roughly) Fregean manner, as
(ways of determining) truth-values, Kronecker's constructivist criticism of
classical logic becomes acute. We consider, with Kronecker, a classical
function ƒ e N —» N that is defined by a non-decidable separation of cases:
j l if the Riemann Hypothesis is true
JO if the Riemann Hypothesis is false.
According to Kronecker, and I agree, ƒ is no: well-defined, that is, the rule
does not give a function from N to N. Because consider/(14), say. There is
at present no way of evaluating this to primitive form as an Arabic numeral,
since we cannot (yet) decide the Riemann hypothesis. Thus the definition of
ƒ introduces defined, non-primitive terms, which cannot be eliminated in
favour of primitive terms. As such it goes against the canons of proper defi-
nition that were clearly stated three centuries ago by Pascal.
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Similar considerations now show that under the (Frege-)Materna con-
ception of propositions the universal and existential quantifiers will similarly
introduce non-eliminable non-primitive expressions. The correctness of the
V- and 3-formation rules is not at all clear. We consider the Fregean expla-
nation of the universal quantifier. Let F be a propositionat function, that is, a
function F such that
F(.x) 6 o, provided that x 6 D.
Thus, for any as D, F[aJ.\] is, or, better, evaluates to, a truth-value in o.
Then \\e define with Frege:
f true if F(.v) = true, whenever .v6 D
[false otherwise
The definiens contains a separation of cases that cannot be decided effec-
tively as soon as the domain D is infinite or otherwise unsurveyable. The
analogy to Kronecker's example above is obvious. Accordingly. Frege's
classical V-formation rule (and. of course, 3-formation as well) introduces
defined, non-eliminable ways of determining truth-values. That is, the type 0
of truth-values will have to contain non-primitive elements that cannot be
eliminated by means of evaluation to primitive form. Note also that it is
quantification with respect to an infinite, or unsurveyable, domain D that
poses the problem. Quantification with respect to (propositions, that is, ways
of determining) truth-values is perfectly straightforward:
(V* e i) F(x) =lkf F [TRUE/I] & F [FALSE/*],
since there are only two of them.
5. The Case against the Base Type CD
What is a possible world? Materna (25 ff.) pays allegiance to the current
paradigm of possible worlds concerning the semantics of modality. He is
aware of the need for careful explanations and offers:
Any possible world is a consistent set of facts. ... Further, in a very
clear sense a possible world is a maximum such set of facts. (26)
The facts, ! presume, are the ontological correlata to propositions, so that a
proposition is true at a world if the corresponding fact holds in the world
and false at the world if it does not hold in the world. In view of this, 1 am
not happy with Materna's use of 'fact' here. Following Wittgenstein's
Traclatus, \ would prefer 'state of affairs' (Sachverhall) or 'situation'
(Sachlage) where Materna has 'fact'. Another alternative would be to use
circumstance, a good, neutral term. The, or at least, a point of possible-
worlds semantics is, I take it, that a proposition that is true at one world need
Goran Sundholm 9
not be true at another. Accordingly, the ontological correlata to propositions,
whatever we may call them, must be able to hold, or obtain, in some worlds,
and fail to do so in others. If there be non-actuaî possible worlds (and if
there are not, why bother about the whole machinery), each must contain
something counterfactual, that is, a circumstance (situation, state of affairs)
which obtains in the world in question, but not in the actual world, and
similarly circumstances that obtain in the actual will not hold in the counter-
factual world. Materna's 'fact'-terminology now forces us to speak about
"non-obtaining facts". To my mind this comes close to a contradiction in
terms and hence I would opt for one of the other alternatives. This, however,
is a minor terminological point only, but one, the neglect of which makes the
theory sound strange.
However, there are also real, rather than merely terminological problems
with Materna's conception of a possible world as a maximum consistent set
of circumstances. But for circumstance, about which enough said, the three
operative terms are sel, consistent and maximum. What conception of set
does Materna have in mind here? Clearly not the constructive notion of sets
as constructive type, but also the classical notion of set as an element in the
cumulative hierarchy wilt not serve here, because in general the elements of
the consistent sets will be circumstances, rather than mathematical objects.
Thus one needs to develop a novel "empirical" theory of sets (which, to put
it mildly, seems to be a major task indeed) prior to using the conception of
sets with respect to facts.
The lack of a suitable notion of set is not the least of the problems that
beset the conception of possible worlds as (maximally consistent) sets of
circumstances. Let À be the cardinal of the "set" of possible worlds. Then (at
least classically) there are 2 ' "sets" of possible worlds. But each of these
serve to single out a proposition, that is, a way of determining a truth-value.
Thus there are, at least, 2* propositions. But circumstances, that is, the ele-
ments of possible worlds, are the ontological correlata of propositions. Thus,
there would have to be also 2* circumstances. But then there are many more,
or at least as many, maximally consistent sets of circumstances. That is,
there are 2 ' possible worlds, but by assumption also X is the number of pos-
sible worlds. Therefore. X = 2*. However, we know from Cantor's theorem
that A. < 2*. Thus we have a contradiction. I do not wish to imply that this
reasoning will necessarily refute Materna's theory, but it is indicative of the
difficulties that beset possible-worlds semantics when interpreted as a proper
semantics for a sizeable language.
Furthermore, but for these difficulties that pertain to the notion of set and
the resulting notion of proposition, there are also problems concerning the
notion of a maximum consistent set of circumstances. Usually a set of propo-
sitions is consistent if no contradiction follows logically from it. Here,
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though, the elements of consistent set are, not propositions, but circum-
stances ("facts"). (Here another unfortunate side in the choice of "fact" is
revealed; any set of facts is consistent, since it is realised in the real world.)
What does it mean for circumstances to be consistent? According to what
logic? In the Tractatus the states of affairs are all logically independent, so
the obtaining of one state of affairs (Sachverhalt) is entirely neutral with
respect to the obtaining or non-obtaining of all other states of affairs. It is
not at all clear in what consistency consists for sets of circumstances.
Finally, the maximality of the consistent sets poses problems. How do
we know that there are any maximum consistent sets?. The standard ("Lin-
denbaum") technique for expanding consistent sets of propositions to maxi-
mally consistent sets makes use of an undecidable separation of cases: if a
proposition can be added while preserving consistency add it, otherwise add
its negation. In general, though, we cannot decide whether a set of proposi-
tions is consistent or not. In the case of predicate logic, such decidability is
even mathematically ruled out by the Church-Turing theorem on the unde-
cidability of predicate logic. The proposition q> is logically true (or, is a
theorem) if and only if the singleton set {—i<p} is inconsistent. So if we have
a means for deciding consistency we also have a means for deciding theo-
rem-hood; but the latter cannot be, according to Church and Turing. So how
do we know that maximum-consistent sets exist? There is one kind of proof
that does not make direct use of the Lindenbaum-construction; instead one
observes that the notion of consistency is of finite character and applies one
of the many classical equivalents of the Axiom of Choice, say. a maximum
principle such as Zorn's lemma, or, perhaps most easily, the Teichmuller-
Tukey Lemma. It is one of the great and persistent myths of 20'" century
mathematics that a constructivist is someone who rejects the Axiom of
Choice. On the contrary, that AC is constructively true can be seen directly
from the (constructive) explanation of the meanings of the quantifiers. Be-
cause a proof of
(VjreD)(3ye E) A(x,y)
yields a method, which applied to a given ds D, produces a proof of
(3>>e E)A[dlx,y\.
Such a proof, on the other hand, is nothing but an ordered pair (a. b), where
a e E and b is a proof of A[d/x, aly\. So piecing this together, by mapping
de D to the matching a e E, one obtains a function ƒ e D —> E that effects
the required choice of a y for an x. Thus a proof has been given of
(V*e D)(3ve E) A(x, y) -> (3/e D -» £)(tf;ce D) A[x, ap(f, *)/>•].
The myth contains some truth, though, in that many of the classical equiva-
lents of the Axiom of Choice do not appear to hold constructively. In par-
ticular, the maximum principles are purely existential and offer no means of
constructing the maximum element for which existence is claimed. Indeed,
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the Standard proofs of Zorn's lemma and other equivalents from the Axiom
of Choice all make use of the principle of defining functions by means of
undecided separation of cases, which as we saw above, à propos of Kro-
necker, is not justified.
6. The Case against the Base Type t
Here we can be reasonably brief. In principle, I have no quarrel whatsoever
with the use of the set of reals. Many perfectly constructive treatments are
known, the smoothest being, perhaps, that which uses constructive Cauchy-
sequences. However, Materna also uses the elements of the base type i as
points of time, and this requires more elaboration. Why do the points of time
have to form a continuum? Does not a discrete conception agree as well with
our intuitions? In that case the order-type of the points of time would be that
of the integers Z, rather than that of the reals R, that is. order-type (*u) -t- (u)
rather than order-type 6. (Here, of course, tu are Cantorian order-types, and
not Materna's type of possible worlds.)
How will Materna decide between these option in favour of the re-
als? And how will he treat of discrete time, given his choice of the reals as
time-indices?
As it stands, his choice of the reals for the task of serving as indices of
points in time appears without sufficient grounds.
7, The Case against Partial Functions
In standard type theory, one opts for total functions as the objects of the
function type, and not without good reason, it seems to me. The application-
criterion for the (in general, dependent) function-type (jcea)ß is that one
must know the rule
a€ a
f(a)e$[a/x],
in order to have the right to assert that
/e(*ea)ß,
that is,
when one is entitled to go from aea to/(a)eß[a/.i], one is also enti-
tled to assert that ƒ€ (jce a)ß.4
In the case of partial function-types nothing as simple as this is available,
because, given o e a, there is, in general, no means of knowing whether a
4
 With Schutte and Martin-Lof I use (a)ß for the (total) function type. The total
function takes its arguments in cc and its values in ß. Note the difference in notation
from Materna's (ßa).
—™^
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belongs to the sub-domain of a where ƒ is defined. The superiority of the
total-function type lies just in that this issue is side-stepped. For Materna's
(and Tichy's) partial (ypes, on the other hand, one can know that ƒ s (ßa)—
Materna's notation!—and that a e et, and still do not know whether ƒ can be
applied to a in order to get a value in ß. Also, in general, the relalion of
type-membership will not be a decidable one. It is unclear how to supply
further type-information as to the domain of definition so that one knows
when ƒ is applicable to a given argument and when it is not.
We should also note that Materna uses a set-theoretic conception of type:
in his explanation of the type of partial functions—cf. section 2 above—the
types are treated as sets. However, if we are prepared to use the classic set-
theoretic machinery, why bother about types? Surely the sets are enough. If,
on the other hand, we prefer to use a type theory, within that framework, the
notion of set should be dependent on that of type, and not the other way
round. Materna wants it both ways, and that, in my view is demanding, too
much.
The prosecution rests.
It now only remains for me to offer my warmest congratulations to my
friend Pavel and to await gingerly the broadside that he will fire, let no
doubt remain, in response to my impertinent birthday-questions.
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